Abstract. Catching-up of East German productivity to West German levels has completely faded out since the mid-1990s. The remaining productivity gap cannot be attributed to an inferior capital endowment or qualification deficiencies of the East German labor force. Instead, it appears to be the result of an inappropriate design of industrial policy which concentrated on the subsidization of physical capital and largely ignored the advance of human capital-and service-intensive industrial structures. East Germany will have to face another wave of painful structural adjustment when capital-intensive industries are no longer protected from competition by public subsidies.
INTRODUCTION
Ten years after the launch of the German Economic, Monetary and Social Union, East and West Germany are still far from being economically united. For most observers, the slow speed of catching-up came as a surprise and a disappointment. A much more rapid closing of the income and productivity gap against West Germany had been expected, because East Germany could immediately implement the well-established rules and institutions of the West German market economy and had access to substantial financial support for infrastructure improvements and industrial restructuring.
Few observers have asked, however, whether the close relationship to its Western neighbor really constituted an economic advantage for East Germany or should rather be regarded as part of the misery. It is an open question, for instance, to what extent the complex regulatory framework of West Germany was actually suitable for the transition of East Germany into a market economy, and whether generous financial support actually fostered or hampered industrial restructuring. This paper concentrates on one specific aspect of support from West Germany, namely on the impact of subsidies for East German firms on the speed and direction of structural adjustment. No doubt the immediate collapse of the East German economy after unification would have been even more dramatic in the absence of such subsidies. The paper presents some evidence,
THE EAST GERMAN PRODUCTIVITY PUZZLE
The catch-up process of East Germany has significantly slowed down since the mid-1990s and completely disappeared in the recent past. In 1990, East Germany started with a productivity level of about 25 per cent of West Germany's, whereas relative wages were at a level of 35 per cent. These gaps rather rapidly narrowed in the first years after unification: in 1992, productivity and wages reached about 45 per cent and 60 per cent of the respective West German levels. If this speed had continued (in terms of percentage point reduction), the productivity gap would have been completely closed in 1998 and the wage gap would have been closed even in 1995. As a matter of fact, labor productivity in East Germany is still less than 60 per cent of the West German level and relative wages stagnate around three-quarters ( Figure 1 ). According to recent business cycle forecasts, the picture will not brighten in the years to come.
In the light of conventional growth theory, the fading out of catching-up comes as a surprise. Fixed capital investment in East Germany is much higher than in West Germany, and the capital intensity of East German working places has reached about three-quarters of the West German level (Table 1) . It could be expected, therefore, that the productivity level would be well above three-quarters of the West German level.
A brief back-of-the-envelope calculation based on simple assumptions may help to assess the quantitative size of the East German productivity puzzle. These calculations are not meant to solve the productivity puzzle, but rather to give a rough impression of its magnitude. The first assumption is the prevalence of a Cobb±Douglas (CD) technology both in East and West Germany. Empirical work on growth accounting has repeatedly shown that the CD assumption is a fairly good approximation of reality if the research interest lies in rough estimates of output effects of factor input changes and not in detailed investigations of substitution effects between factors. The second assumption refers to the output elasticity of capital, which should be in the range of the share of profits in total national product. In East Germany, the profit share is still extremely low, whereas it reaches a level of about 20 per cent in West Germany. As a rule, direct estimates of the output elasticity of capital Under the additional assumption of identical technologies in East and West (which represents the absence of institutional borders after unification), the potential relative productivity level of East Germany as compared to West Germany can be calculated as follows:
where y denotes labor productivity, k denotes capital intensity and denotes the output elasticity of capital. The subscripts E and W represent East and West Germany.
The required data on capital intensity are taken from Table 1 . As Figure 2 shows, theoretically predicted productivity in East Germany is not far below the West German level in 1998, whereas actual labor productivity reaches only 60 per cent. This result is quite robust with respect to alternative assumptions about the output elasticity of capital: with an elasticity of 40 per cent the hypothetical relative productivity level reaches 90 per cent, with an elasticity of 30 per cent (as shown in Figure 2 ) it reaches 92 per cent, and with an elasticity of 20 per cent it reaches 95 per cent. In this context, the whole difference between hypothetical and observed labor productivity must be ascribed either to differences in the quality of factor inputs or to an unexplained residual.
• With respect to the quality of capital input, it might be presumed that the East German capital stock would largely consist of outdated equipment inherited from central planning. However, high investment rates over the past ten years have led to a rather rapid modernization of East German production facilities. According to calculations of the Federal Statistical Office, the average age of the capital stock declined from 32.6 years in 1991 to 25.3 years in 1994 (the latest available year). 1 As the high speed of fixed capital formation kept on after 1994, the present-day average age of the East German capital stock probably does not differ significantly from the one in West Germany (1994: 21.3 years).
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• There appears to be no substantial difference in the qualification of the labor force, because formal training levels in the former GDR even exceeded the corresponding levels in West Germany. As Table 2 indicates, the formal qualification advantage of East Germany still persists. As East German workers are increasingly integrated into market-oriented production structures, it can be expected that their informal qualification is more or less equal to West German standards (Bellmann and Brussig, 1998) .
It would be misleading, therefore, to ascribe a significant part of the East German productivity gap to the quality of factor inputs. For this reason, the entire gap between hypothetical and actually observed labor productivity in Figure 2 is labeled as residual gap. This view is supported by the fact that an equal share of firms in East and West Germany (two-thirds) are reporting that their capital equipment represents the latest available technological level (Bellmann and Brussig, 1998, p. 654) .
Of course, the gap between the East German and the West German Solowtype residual displayed in Figure 2 is a simplifying (perhaps oversimplifying) measure for highly complex phenomena. It not only reflects differences in the technological sophistication of products and production processes, but all other determinants of the productivity gap which are not directly covered by the factor input gap discussed above. It can be expected that technology differences in a narrow sense have by and large disappeared because the East German economy has almost unrestricted access to technology from West Germany and other regions. In the privatization process after unification, many East German firms were bought up by West German firms which brought their production technologies and often even their products with them. At present, there appears to be no substantial difference between the West German and the East German stock of technological knowledge. Technology in a narrow sense seems to be, therefore, no suitable candidate for solving the productivity puzzle.
The problem also is that most other explanations are not very convincing (Ragnitz, 1997 (Ragnitz, , 1999 . Some authors have stressed the heterogeneity of capital endowment of East German firms (Dietrich, 1997) , and their difficulties in getting access to bank credits (Ragnitz, 1998) , others have pointed to small firm sizes as compared to West Germany (Beer and Ragnitz, 1997) or to East±West differences in the sectoral structure of the economy (Rothfels, 1997) ; several authors have analyzed the consequences of managerial and organizational deficiencies (Mallok, 1996; Mu È ller et al., 1998; Bellmann and Brussig, 1998) . All these studies have in common, however, is that they are able to explain only a limited part of the observed productivity gap between East and West Germany. Hence, economic research is still confronted with an East German productivity puzzle.
One might argue that different productivity levels between East and West Germany should be no reason to worry, because they would simply reflect typical core±periphery relationships. However, this view ignores that the productivity gap is substantially larger than the wage gap which drives East German unit labor costs well above West German levels.
3 The obvious result of this competitive disadvantage is the extremely high level of East German unemployment. If one cares about East German unemployment, one should also care about the productivity gap. Relative unit labor costs in East Germany can be calculated from Figure 1 by the ratio of relative wages to relative productivity. For the year 1998, for instance, such a calculation shows that unit labor costs in East Germany exceed the corresponding West German level by 24 per cent.
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Of course, one should also care about wage policy, but that goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
INDUSTRIAL POLICY: WHICH FACTOR SHOULD BE SUBSIDIZED?
No doubt, policy-makers care about unemployment and related socioeconomic issues in East Germany. Industrial restructuring is not left to anonymous market forces, but it is strongly influenced by government intervention. A significant part of this intervention is directed at conserving a limited number of jobs in capital-intensive industries such as basic chemicals, oil refineries, steel mills and shipyards. Other subsidy programs are concerned with prestigious high-tech projects such as the Siemens computer chip factory near Dresden which also requires substantial capital input for a handful of jobs. Moreover, there is a large variety of general support programs ranging from tax credits for fixed capital investment over preferential depreciation rules to regional programs which are co-financed by the European Union, the federal and the respective state governments. All these industrial policy instruments have in common is that they are directed at fixed capital formation. In general, investment in physical capital is a precondition for getting access to subsidies.
5
The most prominent support programs at the federal level are displayed in Table A .1 in the Appendix. Originally, this emphasis was chosen because the capital stock inherited from the GDR had largely to be scrapped due to the exchange rate shock and the sharp increase of real wages after unification. Policy-makers were convinced that modernizing the East German capital stock would be a precondition for the creation of future-oriented production structures and jobs. From an economist's view, however, it is much less convincing why industrial policy should reduce the relative price of the scarce factor (capital) and implicitly raise the relative price of the abundant factor (labor). There are severe doubts whether the subsidization of capital is really the right policy response to economic problems which are dominated by high and stubborn unemployment. 6 The impact of different types of industrial policy measures on employment are illustrated in Figure 3 . The isoquants Y and Y H represent an underlying production function which describes the available production technology in East Germany. This technological relationship should not be misinterpreted as the production possibility frontier of a closed economy, because East Germany has rather unrestricted access to West German and international capital markets. A production function in the conventional form, which is interpreted 5.
According to Sinn (1995) , capital costs for investment in East Germany have even been negative due to massive public support. A concentration of public support on labor input rather than on capital input was recommended, for instance, by Akerlof et al. (1991) , Begg and Portes (1992) , and Klodt (1990 Klodt ( , 1992 ). 6.
It should be noted, however, that simple models of wage subsidization are also affected by severe drawbacks. The most serious problem results from their impact on wage negotiations, because the labor market pressure on unions would be reduced (Siebert, 1993, p. 140; 1998, p. 269; Fuest and Huber, 1997). as the relationship between output and available factor inputs, does not make sense in a world of international factor mobility. Hence, Figure 3 does not illustrate the factor prices which would prevail under given factor endowment, but allows us to identify the factor intensities chosen by profit-maximizing firms under different factor price regimes.
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In any case, it can be assumed that the real rate of return on capital is exogenous to the East German economy, because it is determined on world capital markets or at least on German capital markets which are dominated by West Germany. In the initial reference situation represented by point a on isoquant Y, no subsidies are paid. It is further assumed that the reservation wage of East German workers is above its full-employment level. Hence, labor demand L is lower than labor supply, and unemployment prevails.
8 Figure 3 The impact of subsidies on capital intensity and employment Source: Sinn and Sinn (1991, p. 169) ; Klodt (1996, p. 164) .
7.
If Figure 3 is interpreted this way, it is also compatible with unemployment resulting from excessive wages. 8.
Under strict neoclassical assumptions, it is difficult to substantiate how an unemployment equilibrium such as point a can be achieved under the assumptions of exogenous factor prices and perfect interregional capital mobility. With linear±homogeneous technology, it would be predicted that there is either full employment or no employment at all. With mobile capital, unemployment can only occur if (1) the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale, (2) a third, regionally immobile, production factor exists, or (3) If the East German economy has access to subsidies paid from outside (from West Germany), its isoquant shifts outwards to Y H , because it becomes profitable to employ additional production factors. Additional capital flows in from West Germany or from abroad, and additional workers can be recruited from East German unemployment. The size of the employment effect crucially depends on the type of subsidization:
• If capital input is subsidized, the real interest rate for East German producers declines from r to r s ; the factor price line becomes steeper; and the production equilibrium moves to b with an employment level of L H .
•
If labor input is subsidized, producer real wages decline from w to w s ; the factor price line is flattened; and the production equilibrium moves to c with an employment level of L HH .
Irrespective of the specific properties of the production function, L HH will always exceed L H as long as the isoquants are convex. The reason is that subsidization not only creates a level effect, but also a substitution effect which results from changes in the capital intensity of production. If subsidization is tied to physical capital, firms get an incentive to substitute labor-intensive production processes by capital-intensive ones, which reduces the job-creation effect of subsidization. If the curvature of the isoquants is rather flat (i.e. if the elasticity of substitution is high), the substitution effect may even exceed the level effect. Hence, L H may be even lower than L.
9
It can be argued, therefore, that the heavy support of fixed capital formation in East Germany is distorting the production structure towards an inefficiently high capital intensity. In addition, the maintenance of East German working places is unnecessarily costly, because subsidization requirements per worker would have been significantly lower under a regime of wage subsidization or a neutral regime of value-added subsidization (for instance, by a reduced VAT level on East German products).
ALLOCATIVE DISTORTIONS IN EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY
Against the background of the previous section, it can be expected that the emphasis of industrial policy on fixed capital formation results in an oversized share of capital-intensive industries in East Germany. The empirical examination of this proposition is hampered, however, by two major obstacles. labor input is sufficiently heterogeneous which makes the employment of higher qualified workers profitable, whereas the marginal product of less qualified workers falls short of the uniform reservation wage. (For a formal presentation of this line of argument see Lorz, 1997.) 9.
Industry-specific labor demand functions estimated by Gerling (1998) have demonstrated that such an overcompensation has actually occurred in some East German industries. Such industries would have realized higher employment if the government had completely refrained from subsidization. The first obstacle is the above-mentioned lack of appropriate national accounts statistics for East Germany. As these statistics at the sectorally disaggregated level only refer to Germany as a whole, one has to rely upon industry statistics which are mainly concerned with the manufacturing sector. The shortcomings of official statistics are further aggravated by the fact that they do not provide information about capital stock of industries. Fortunately, at least for manufacturing industries capital stock data are compiled by three research institutes which are engaged in periodical reports on structural adjustment in East Germany on behalf of the federal German government.
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This section relies heavily on these reports ± especially on the latest one (DIW, IfW, IWH, 1999), which is also the final one, because the project has expired.
The second obstacle is a methodological one. It is concerned with the difficulties of defining a reasonable empirical yardstick for the term`oversized'. It has been discussed at length whether the appropriate reference measure for evaluating the structure of the East German economy can be found in the corresponding structures in West Germany. On the one hand, it is argued that East and West Germany are both exposed to identical political and social institutions, are constituting an almost perfectly integrated capital market and will eventually face more or less identical factor prices (see, e.g., Hoffmann, 1992) . On the other hand, it is argued that there are large industry structure differences even across different states within West Germany. There would therefore be no reason for East Germany to perfectly mimic West German structures (see, e.g., Lammers, 1994) .
Of course, there is some truth in the latter view, but regional differences in industry structure should not be misinterpreted as evidence for the irrelevance of sectoral specialization. Some countries may be able to earn high incomes with sophisticated consumer goods or high-priced fashion articles, others may concentrate on top-quality motor cars or customer-tailored machine tools, but no high-wage country will be able to survive on the basis of standardized, lowtech and low-productivitiy industries in the long run. From an international perspective, East Germany must surely be regarded as a high-wage country, although there still exists a considerable wage gap against West Germany. It seems reasonable, therefore, that a viable East German economy should be based on similar types of industries as West Germany, although not necessarily on identical industry patterns at a highly disaggregated level. Hence, if disaggregation is not driven too far, the industry structure of the West German economy can serve as a useful yardstick for evaluating the sustainability of the East German industry structure. This is not to say that further disaggregation would not yield further information. Highly disaggregated data allow us to re-aggregate industries by economically meaningful criteria. Therefore, the following analysis rests upon 10.
These estimates are based on careful evaluations of the size of the capital stock inherited from the GDR, on gross investment since 1991 and on conventional assumptions about depreciation.
the most disaggregated level of industry statistics available, with capital stock data as the limiting variable. Before entering sectoral details, it should be noted that the capital intensity of East German manufacturing on average even slightly exceeds the West German level. An East German workplace is equipped with a fixed capital amount of 285,000 DM, whereas the corresponding amount in West Germany is 280,000 DM (Table 3) .
11 Nevertheless, there are large differences across industries. In oil refineries or in the motor car industry, for instance, capital endowment of workplaces exceeds the respective West German endowment by more than 50 per cent, whereas in electrical machinery or in apparel it lies below 50 per cent of the West German level.
In order to identify similarities and differences in industrial structure, individual industries have been arranged into three groups, where industries of the high capital-intensity group are identified by a capital intensity above 400,000 DM per employee and industries of the low capital-intensity group by a capital intensity below 220,000 DM per employee. As the third and fourth columns of Table 3 show, the share of high capital-intensive industries is 1.2 percentage points higher than in West Germany, whereas the share of low capital-intensity industries is lower by 8.9 percentage points. Keeping in mind that East Germany should exhibit a comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries, the actually observed specialization pattern can most likely be ascribed to the fixed capital bias of public subsidies. Moreover, the low share of labor-intensive industries should be viewed with concern because these industries are in general not only labor intensive, but also human-capital and technology intensive. Hence, the relative factor price bias of industrial policy not only conserves old, capital-intensive structures, but also impedes the evolution of modern, innovation-oriented and technology-intensive production structures.
As discussed above, capital-oriented subsidization schemes for East Germany are vindicated by many observers because high wage claims of East German workers require high productivity levels which in turn can only be achieved by high capital intensities. The low rate of job creation in capital-intensive industries inevitably had to be accepted, it is argued, because it would be preferable to create a few highly productive and competitive jobs rather than to subsidize many jobs in low-productive, labor-intensive structures.
For this line of argument to be valid, industries with relatively high capital intensities should also be characterized by relatively high productivity levels. However, the empirical pattern does not confirm this presumption. The industry with the highest relative capital intensity as compared to West Germany, oil refineries, does not achieve the highest, but the lowest, relative productivity level (Figure 4) . Relative productivity is also quite low in basic metals and in the motor car industry, which come next in relative capital 11.
As shown above (see Table 1 ), the relative capital intensity of the East German economy as a whole is substantially lower. intensity. Across all manufacturing industries, there appears to be no systematic relationship between these two variables. 12 Hence, industrial policy even failed with respect to its narrow goal of modernizing those parts of East German manufacturing which absorb the main bulk of public subsidies.
One might expect that the distortions in East German manufacturing at the expense of labor-intensive industries would result in rather low capacity utilization rates in capital-intensive industries, where investment decisions are most strongly affected by public support schemes. However, the available data do not support this presumption. Questionnaire results from the ifo Institute do not display substantial differences of capacity utilization across different subgroups of manufacturing. Even in basic industries, which are by and large identical to capital-intensive industries, no exceptional excess capacities can be observed (Table 4) . For the manufacturing sector as a whole, capacity utilization steadily improved over time and has almost reached West German levels in the late 1990s, whereas relative productivity growth has stagnated since 1994. Capacity utilization obviously does not provide the answer to the East German productivity puzzle.
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As long as the user costs of capital are positive even after subsidization, it would not pay to establish production capacities which do not meet market 12.
The Pearson correlation coefficient of À0.177 for the data presented in Figure 4 even indicates a negative, although statistically insignificant, relationship.
13.
A similar conclusion is drawn by Ragnitz (1999) .
Figure 4
Relative capital intensity and labor productivity in East German manufacturing industries (West Germany = 100)
Source: demand. It may pay, however, to disregard market opportunities in human capital and technology-intensive industries, because rent seeking may dominate profit seeking. As mentioned above, the low weight of laborintensive industries in East German manufacturing also reflects a low human capital intensity. As a result of such an allocative distortion, East German producers may find it difficult to sell their products, which are technologically lagging behind, at similar prices on internationally open markets as West German producers. This view is supported by the results of detailed East±West price comparisons carried out by Mu Èller (1999). He shows that output prices of East German manufacturing are about 20 per cent lower than West German output prices, whereas input prices are more or less the same. Hence, the gap in implicit value-added prices is even larger. According to his calculations, the East±West productivity gap in manufacturing would shrink from 45 per cent to 15 per cent if East German producers were able to sell their value-added at West German implicit price levels. Improving the price position on markets for manufactured goods essentially requires a high service intensity of industrial production (Klodt et al., 1997) . The provision of high-priced differentiated products depends on intense research and development, on adequate sales and after-sales services and on excellent product design and marketing ± i.e. on intermediate service activities. Not only in the service sector, but also in manufacturing the importance of muscle power diminishes and the importance of brain power rises. In accordance with these trends, employees with tertiary qualifications gain ground in West German manufacturing. In East German manufacturing, by contrast, their share in total manufacturing employment has even declined since the early 1990s and is now far below the corresponding West German level ( Figure 5 ). 14 It would be difficult to deny that the emphasis of industrial policy on physical capital formation has contributed to this unfavorable development.
CONCLUSIONS
Immediately after German unification, most observers were aware of the fact that East German productivity was substantially lagging behind West German levels, although the size of the gap may have come as a surprise. Policy-makers were convinced that closing the gap would above all require the fundamental reconstruction of East German capital stock. Modernizing equipment and buildings was regarded as the essential prerequisite for improving the competitiveness of East German industry and raising productivity levels to West German standards.
With respect to the capital endowment of working places, this strategy was undoubtedly successful ± at least in the manufacturing sector, where the capital intensity and the average age of the capital stock nowadays are similar to West Germany's. With respect to productivity, however, the strategy failed.
14. Figure 5 is based upon a sectoral classification of occupations which is available from the author upon request. Although physical capital formation is still heavily subsidized, a substantial productivity disadvantage against West Germany persists. The analyses presented in this paper are not intended to solve the productivity puzzle, but to draw attention to the impact of industrial policy on structural adjustment and productivity growth which is largely neglected in other studies. Presumably, the strategy of fostering capital intensity hampered the development of viable industrial structures based upon human capital-and service-intensive products and production processes. The sectoral structure is distorted in favor of capital-intensive industries which are often indistinguishable from ailing smokestack industries. The flip side of the coin is the low weight of human capital-intensive industries and the disregard of intermediate service activities, which constitute an indispensable prerequisite for the provision of sophisticated industrial goods and the realization of high productivity growth rates. To a large extent, the present industry structure of East Germany resembles the structure of declining regions in the West which are exposed to severe adjustment problems. Hence, the medicine of an illdesigned industrial policy may have even aggravated the disease.
During the past decade, East Germany has had to cope with substantial structural adjustment. It must be feared that another wave of painful adjustment will turn up when public subsidies are gradually reduced and when those structures which rely upon subsidized capital input are no longer sheltered from market competition. 
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